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THE ETHICS OF ADVOCACY.
By HON. FRANK IRVINE, Dean Cornell University Law School.
(The American Law Sohool Review, May, 1913.)
I propose to address myself to a consideration of the conduct of the
lawyers during the trial, and especially during a trial by jury, considering
nothing which has not a distinctly ethical basis, and yet speaking of some
things whose ethical sanction is not always borne in mind.
It is not my purpose to discuss the entire course of the trial, or all
questions of conduct which present themselves to the trial lawyer. I cannot
even claim the merit of novelty for what I am about to say; but it is my
impression that these topics I am approaching have received attention more
frequently from the standpoint of successful advocacy than from the standpoint of ethical advocacy. Yet there is little difference in the results. It
will be found that in the long run at least correct advocacy becomes successful advocacy.
Most deviations from the rules of propriety are the result of:too great
zeal for success in the particular cause, or, if you prefer, too great zeal
In support of the client's interest. Great mischief has been done by the
frequent quotation of a passage in Lord Brougham's speech in Queen
Caroline's case. This passage standing alone, reads thus:
"An advocate, by the sacred duty which he- owes to his client, knows,
in the discharge of that office,, but one person in the world-that client
and none other. To save that client by all expedient means, to protect
that client at all hazards and cost to all others, and among others to
himself, is the highest and most unquestioned .of his duties; and he must
not. regard' the alarm, -the suffering, the. torment, the destruction which
he may bring upon the bther. Nay, separating. even the duties of a
patriot from -those of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the
wind, he must go on, reckless of the consequences, if his fate it should
unhappily be to involve-his country in confusion for his client's protection."
It hias frequently been pointed out that Lord Brougham was not speaking
as broadly as the excerpt indicates, but that this characteristic outburst
of eloquence was simply a threat to establish the marriage of George IV
with Mrs. Fitzherbert.
It is entirely true that no selfish considerations should deter the advocate from performing his full duty toward his client. It is true that toward
his client he owes his most direct and important duty. Having accepted a
retainer,.he is bound in honor as well as in law to see that his client's case
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is presented In its strongest and most favorable aspect. The client is entitled to have th6 law of his case determined finally by the court, and, in a
law action, the facts'by a jury. ThQ advocate has no right, upon doubtful
questions of- factor of law, to usurp the vocations of jury anid judge, andfinally. and-t rreoably 'determine such, questions agalfist -his client, by refusing to. subnit them for consideration.
On the other hand, the lawyer must never forget that he is an officer
of the court, and in that relation has as grave a public responsibility as the
judge .himself. He is trying the case with the object of winning it, and not
of losing it, but of winning it in accordance with thefacts and rules of law,
and not by pererting facts*or by distorting the law. He Is not the servant
of his client, employed to win lfWidh can by any expedient, but the servant
of the law, retained 'by' the client to secure the lawful. adjustment of his
rights.
The trial of an issue either of fact or of law is essentially-a contest, and
I liave scant sympathy with those doctrinaires who would attempt to eliminate the contentious element from litigation. Litigation is in its very nature
contentious, and must be carried on by contentious methods. This means
*that in its very nature the trial of an action must tend to arouse what is
known as "fighting blood," and without fighting blood to be aroused no
advocate -can hope for sudcess or hope to do his client justice. But in all
contests, .from 'war to marbles, there are faii methods -and foul methods,
and.the advocate must, be ever on guard lest the escitement of the fray lead
him beyond the domain of the fair., I suppose no lawyer can hope on all
occaslons to confine himself within the bounds of :strict propriety. Those
of us -who have had any. considerable experience in trials, I am sure, have
lingering in our memories various courtroom ,scenes for which we were
responsible, which we regret and would like to forget. The best safeguard
I know against such lapses-is in moments of temptation and excitement to
remind yourself that you are in a court of justice, that you are of a court
of justice," and that you are an. officer .of the law.
You will find, as you become familiar with the courts, that there are
certain conventions, some general and some local. You will find that in
-some" courts it -is customary for the bar, to rise as the judges enters, and
to -remain 'standing until he takes his seat. You will find. that in other
courts no such-custom prevails. If you-are'used to the custom, I believe
you-will experience something of a shock when you witness the opening
of court where this trifling tribute of respect to the judicial office is not
shown.- By rule of court in this state, counsel Is required to stand while
addressing the court or examining a witness. No such rule should be necessary Some lawyers snap out objections to testimony without rising from
their chairs and with an abruptness that savors of rudeness. With a quick
witness objections must be promptly interposed; but many advocates manage
to 'interpose them with sufficient promptness and without any apparent violation of the rules of courtesy or good manners.
I You will not infrequently observe lawyers within the tar, and not engaged in the case trial,- conferring together-perhaps to the disturbance of
the proceedings,, and certainly in disregard of the dignity of the court. The
lawyer should bring his manners into the courtroom. If he possesses none,
he should borrow a'set for courtroom use.
Sometimes, when motions are' on hearing,, there is a scramble about the
-judge's desk not altogether unsuggestive of a football scrimmage. The
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court attendants should take care of that, and the judge should see that
they do so. What..is less readily handled-is the habit of some lawyers who
seem to take literally the phrase "to get'the ear of -the court," and whose
applications are made in whispers. Such lawyers should be taught to hand
up their papers in silence or to stand back and talk like men and lawyers.
Such things relate to courtroom etiquette,-but they- have their ethical
aspect. A respectful and dignified demeanor in court accompanies and evidences -respect for the law and for. its ministers. Can it be expected that
jurors, witnesses, litigants, or casual spectators will feel a due respect for
the law or its officers if the lawyers themselves fail in manifestations of
respect. In these days. when the demagogues have discovered a certain
popularity in reverting to the tactics of Jack Cade, it is especially important
that lawyers should avoid, even in their slightest acts, all things which may
tend to encourage disrespect for the courts, and, therefore for thp law itself.
The first. and third of the Canons of Ethics deal special.y with the
rblations between the lawyer and the judge. The first enjoins upon the
lawyer a respectful attitude toward the court,."not for the sake of, temporary
incumbent of the judicial. office, .but for .the. maintenance of its supreme.
import.ance." The third warns the lawyer against -t'marked attention and
unusual hospitality on the part. of a lawyer to a judge, 'uncalled forby the
personal relations of the parties." It. Is not that there is serious danger. of
a judge being cajoled by such cheap flattery into extending undue favors
to the fawning lawyer, but because such attentions place the judge in a false
position, and subject both him and .the lawyer to suspicion.
In court an advocate must be always respectful, but never sycophantic
or servile. He must sustain, not only the lignity of the court, but the
dignity of the advocate. The judge rests under the same duty. History
affords, it is true, occasional instances of arbitrary, o'erbearing, or insolent
judges. You may be called upon to appear before men of that type, but.
judicial bad. manners must not tempt you into behavior of a retaliatory
character. A dignified and respectful assertion of your own rights is. the
only proper rebuke. Fortunately the instances are rare when the lawyer is
called upon to withstand this supreme test of his temper.
Courtesy toward one's opponent is not so nearly. universal as courtesy
toward the court. Your opponent may assume a contemptuous' attitude.
He may provoke you by ridicule or by sneers. He may.sometfmes be openily
and grossly, insolent. It is hard under these circumstances to -deal vIth
him with good-natured courtesy. it is true he does-not deserve it. But again
y'our duty to the court and to the*law demands that yciu observe your own
good maniers. It may be added that your duty to your client lies in the
same direction. The jury has'no sympathy with.a rowdy. You are under
no obligation to prevent its sympathy froin drifting your way by convincing
the jury that there are rowdies on both sides of the counsel table. If your
opponent assumes untenable positions and advances absurd arguments, their
character in that respect will impress itself upon: the court or the jury
or you can at the proper time demonstrate their character. The method
of doing so is not by open inanifestations of ridicule or contempt.
Serjeant Harris, Mr. Wellman, and I believe all others who have undertaken to instruct us in the art of advocacy,'have dwelt on the general policy
of treating witnesses with frankness, respect, and amiability. It is not only
good policy, but it is. your moral' duty to do so. You will naturally be well
disposed toward your own witnesses, at least unless they prove stupid, or
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surprise you by testifying otherwise than as they have led you to believe.
Still one's own witness sometimes tries one's patience. With your opponent's witnesses the trial is greater. Indeed, it seems to be the uniform
method of some cross-examiners to proceed upon the theory that an adverse
witness is necessarily a perjurer, to be bullied and threatened into selfcontradictions. I again leave the policy of this system to Mr. Wellman,
whose books should be read by every student.
But again policy and duty go hand in hand. Sometimes a witness commits deliberate out-and-out perjury. If you are sure the witness has done
so, you owe him no duty of considerateness. Few witnesses, on the other
hand, tell the complete and exact truth. They have not observed accurately.
Their inferences, based upon what they did observe, have not always been
correct. Their memory has not been perfect. For these reasons, their
testimony.may depart very far from what you believe to be the truth. And
yet the witnesses have been honest, and they are entitled to be treated as
honest men. You must remember that the witness is at a disadvantage.
You have the sole power of directing the line of inquiry and determining its
scope. He may do nothing but answer the question you put. You should
cohfine yourself to putting questions, and to putting them fairly. Ia most
cases he is not there because he wants to be there. Often he ins not interested In the result. Presumably he is in attendance in furtherance of
justice, and you have no right to treat him as if he were engaged in a conscious and deliberate effort to pervert justice, unless his own language and
conduct have demonstrated this to be the fact.
I have spoken of putting questions fairly. You have no right skillfully to
design to elicit from a witness-especially one unaccustomed to nice diction
answers which are literally false. You have no right to devise a question,
and insist upon an answer which leaves the witness in a false position.
You have doubtless heard of the advocate who said to a hostile witness,
"Have you left off beating your wife?" and tried to compel him to answer it
"Yes" or "No". The witness is entitled to fair treatment, not only during
the examination, but in the argument. You must not put into his mouth
words he did not utter, and you must not give to words he did utter a
construction which you know he did not intend.
In thus dealing with the examination of witnesses, I have not meant to
imply that you must show your hand before asking a question. In crossexamination it is frequently of great importance that the witness should
not divine your object. You have an entire right to test his memoryto test his powers of observation and his opportunities for observation.
You have an equal right to lead him into the disclosure of prejudices or
interests which will affect his credibility. You have no right to undertake
to terrify him into contradictions by shouting at him. You have no right
to lead him into untruthful statements by confusing him. You have no
right to send him away from the stand humiliated and conscious of having
failed in accuracy, when he has in fact been trying to tell the truth. Aside
from the rights of the witness in such matters, it must be remembered that
a witness, leaving the court after having been browbeaten, bullied, and
ridiculed, is likely to cherish resentment against lawyers in general, and
that such resentment extends itself to courts and to the law.
What should be the advocate's attitude toward jurors?
third of the Canons of Ethics must be observed:

The twenty-
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"All attempts to curry favor with jurors by fawning, flattery, or
pretended solicitude for their personal comfort are unprofessional.
Suggestions of counsel, looking to the comfort or convenience of jurors,
and propositions to dispense with argument, should be made to the
court out of the jury's hearing. A lawyer must never converse privately
with jurors about the case; and both before and during the trial he
should avoid communicating with them, even as to matters foreign to
the cause."
The caution against conversing privately with jurors about the case is
obvious. The direct legal consequences of such conduct are usually a
sufficient deterrent. Besides these, the suspicion of such conduct is enough
in Itself to ground an even graver suspicion, that of jury-fixing. Unfortunately there are lawyers who would not think of approaching a juror, who yet
approach, or endeavor to approach, the judge. There are even'those who do
not seem to realize that there is any impropriety in an attempt at private
conversation with the judges concerning a pending case. The canon referred
to is chiefly aimed at subtler methods than private conversation with judge
or jury. It refers to undue solicitation for the convenience or comfort of
jurors. The comfort of the jury should be kept in mind. The juror's lot
Is not always a happy one. He may during the trial be corralled with his
fellows in a hotel, and the hotel is often selected with more regard to
economy than comfort. The jurors are sometimes marched back and forth
between courtroom and hotel in such a manner as to suggest a jail rather
than the hotel as one end of the route. Possibly such things are necessary;
possibly they are not; fortunately we are not called upon now to decide.
The court should, and counsel nray presume that It will, see to it that
the physical comfort of jurors is as well looked after as is practicable.
Judges and lawyers accustomed to long sessions of court sometimes
forget that as a rule the task of listening hour after hour with close attention
to testimony and argument is to most of the jurors, novel, and to all of them
much more trying than to the more active and more experienced participants
in the trial. Justice, as well as jurors, is likely to suffer if the sessions are
unreasonably protracted, although the judge may be the recipient of thoughtless applause for vigorously pressing proceedings in such manner. I do not
believe that counsel should be deemed guilty of any discourtesy toward the
court if, when he observes that jurors are beginning to grow weary, he suggests a recess or adjournment. But no such suggestion should be made in
the hearing of the jury.
The rather coarse flattery of jurynien by repeatedly referring to them as
"Intelligent and honest jurors" has largely gone into the waste basket of the
advocate along with the perfervid oratory whereby Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, and the blood of our ancestors were invoked to
determine the title to a heifer calf. A more professional and a more effective method is to assume the honesty and the intelligence of the jurors
without telling them that you do so. Certain pernicious efforts to accomplish the same general object are, however, still observed. A turn of the
head toward the jury, with a significant smile, as a witness answers a question or the court rules on an objection may have its effect with some men;
but these and similar tricks should be carefully avoided, more especially so
because they are difficult for the court to control. A smile or a nod of the
head may be a gross contempt of court, but it is hard to put it on record.
While the canon I have quoted should be strictly observed, it should
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also -be-'iemembered that jurors are entitled to courteous treatment and to
faii treatment, and that this is true before they are sworn, as well as afterwards. Advocates are not prodigal with their peremptory challenges, and
there is strong- motive for disclosing, if possible, a cause for challenge in
the' base of a juror 'who 'seems undesirable. No -one can quarrel with the
asking' of reasonable questions for the purpose of eliciting ground of
challenge to the cause or to the favor., Here; however, is presented the
shyster's opportunity of asking questions ostensibly to disclose bias or to
test intelligence, but in fact intended to confuse the juror. Again, the best
jurors are likely not to be' overanxious to serve., It is astonishing on a
murder trial what a large ,portion of the community seems to be .violently
opposed to' capital punishnent. It is very easy to dispose -of jurors who
ought to be acceptable by a little encouragement and a little leading in certain directions.'
In this connection it'may'be'well to utter a word of warning against
the pernicious'practice of endeavoring to try the- case while impaneling the
jury. The latitude necessarily permitted in' the preliminary examination of
jurors opens the door to' advancing suggestions which may have a potent
influenc6 on the verdict, but relating none the less to matters which cannot
be offered in evidence and -which should not be Considered in determining the
merits. A single illustration will suffice:
There has arisen within' comparatively-recent years a group of insurance.
companies, commonly -called casualty companies,, whose business it is to
insure against liability for damages for personal injuries. Employers of
labor, - especially in. tfe 'more -hazardous industries, .quite generally avail
themselves of the indemnity -offered by 'these 'companies; It.- was soon perceived that juries would be -more ready to give large verdicts for the. plaintiff in personal injury cases- if they knew. that the loss would fall, not on
a local industry, but on an insuranice 'ompany.
An attempt wag-made in
New York to 'place that fact of insurance directly before the jury by evideiice, on the theory that the defendant, if insured, was less likely to use due
care.' Such evidence was 'held inadmissible,, and counsel' quite, severely
rebuked for offering it. Cosselmon v.. Dunfee,- 1.72 N. Y. -507, 65 N. E. 494;
Loughlin v. Brassil, 187 N. Y. 128, .79 .N. E. 854. Therdupow. the device was
resorted to of inquiring of prospective jurors whether they were stockholders
or interested in any casualty company, or in a particular casualty company.
This was supported on'the theory that it- tended to- show interest adverse
to the plaintiff in that class of cases, and therefore was ground.of challenge
to the-.favor. -Rinklin v. Acker, 125 App." Div. 244, '109 N. -Y. Supp, '125;
Hoyt v. Davis Manufacturing Co., 112 App. Div. 755, 98 N. Y. Supp. 1031.
In spite of several cases of this character, the point 'seems -to have been
considered somewhat doubtful, and therefore the Legislature in 1911, by an.
amendment to section 1180 of the Code'of Civil Procedure, expressly provided
that such facts might- be shown as ground of challenge to the favor.
.There, therefore, can no longer be. any legal objection 'to the asking of
such a questibn, and it is possible that in some communities there may be
grounds for suspecting that certain jurors may be stockholders or officers or
employes of these casualty companies. I ask you; however, -to consider,
when you hear a lawyer ask every juror called on an ordinary panel if-he is
stockholder or .an employe -of a casualty company, whether'.he is. honestly
trying to ascdrtain if 'the jhrors are 'so interested, or is he -trying to get
before the jury the suggestion' that-the defendant is insured,, knowing that
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he has -no right to prove or to openly state the fact and ,perhaps knowing
that the fact is ,contrary to the suggestion. As the question is now clearly
admissible, it must. be left to. the moral sepse of the. lawyer to determine
Whether or not he will ask it.
In the examination of witnesses different. lawyers present as great a contrast from the standpoint of ethics as from the standpoint of skill. It is,
generally true in this as in other matters that the course dictated by moral
consideralons is -also the course that leads towards. success. I would not
venture to say that,this is always. true. Certainly devices resorted _to by
many successful advocates do not withstand any severe moral test.
The stupid advocate usually begins by objecting to every question asked
by his adversary. The preliminary questions, which should be disposed of
as quickly and directly as possible, are objected to as leading. The crucial
questions are objected to as "incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial."
No more specific reason is given, because geneially the only specific reason
entertained by the. objector is .that the answer may. hiurt his side of tie case.
Persistent, groundless objections, due. solely to. stupidity, must be tolerated,
, .Tl~ere is, however, another class of advocates, by no means stupid, who"
interposes persistent objections, stated as diffusely as possible, not becausehe believes the objections .should be or will be sustained, but because he
knows their effect will be. to break up the continuity of the testimony, divert.
the Attention of the jury, and lessen the-effect of the adverse evidence. At
last one judgment has been in recent years reversed, not.because, of. error
in any particular, ruling, but in the cumulative effect of all the rulings, and of
the .constant interruptions of the counsel on trivial. grounds,, so as to pjre-.
vent a fair trial. Venuto v. Lizzo, 148 App. Div. 164, 132 N. Y, Supp. 1066.
The right to object can hardly be curtailed, so here again the appeal
must be to the moral sense of the advocate, not to abuse this right, and to
use it only when there is fair ground for insisting upon the objection, and
far hope that it may sustained. Never should, the right be.used with a
conscious feeling that the real object is to prevent the orderly introduction
of evidence.
What shall we say to the propriety of offering evidence believe d to b.e inadmissible under the rules of law? Upon this subject the twenty-second of
the Canons says:
"A lai~yer should not offer evidence which he knows the court
should reject in order to get the same before the jury by argument for
its admissibility."
This statement is suficiently, and I believe properly, guardedl.
tinguished judge has made this statement:

A dis-

"Never press upon the court evidence you know to be. incompetent,
nor that which .is even doubtful, unless you must-have it or fail."
The reason he gives places emphasis iipon the woi'd press, "dud"accounts
for the rather remarkable qualification of his main statemeiit. He 'adds:
"Too much persistency may prejudice you wfth the jury, wear upon
the patience of the court, and, if by overpersuation he yields, mi.y result
in a reversal upon'appeal. If the case is one where you'are likely to get
a verdict, you 6annot afford to imperil it by' taknig chances."
This -is very well from the tactical point of view,, but how about..,the
ethical?- It would seem that .iTe may reach a reasonably safe conclusioi from
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certain premises which will not be seriously disputed. A lawyer should
not endeavor to lead the court into error, and there are higher reasons
for this precept than the mere danger of reversal upon appeal. Therefore
a lawyer should avoid, not only pressing, but offering, evidence which he
knows to be inadmissible. If his purpose in offering it is to place indirectly
before the jury a fact which he knows the court would not permit to be
proved directly, his moral offense is augmented.
On the other hand, much evidence is of such character that its admissibility may be doubtful. It is not the duty of the advocate, nor is it .his
right, finally to determine doubtful questions upon his own judgment and
against the interests of his client. Within limitations it is the right of the
client to have doubtful questions submitted for determination-doubtful
questions of law to the court, as much as doubtful questions of fact to the
jury. It may be that the lawyer is strongly impressed with the opinion that
certain evidence should not be admissible. It the courts have determined
that such evidence is admissible, he fails in his duty if he does not offer
it, in spite of his private opinion as to what the law ought to be. If its
admissibility has not been decided, I believe he also fails in his duty unless
he offers the evidence, if it be important, and submits the question for a
decigion.
ie should not, in this or in any other matter, express a personal
opinion in support of his offer. Entire candor requires that the proffer
should be made with a suggestion that it is not confidently advanced and
calls for the exercise of deliberate judgment.
I have said that the lawyer falls in his duty unless he makes a proffer
of such doubtful evidence. I have not been considering the tactical aspect
of the problem, but this reacts upon the ethical. The weight of the doutbful
evidence may be so slight that it is better to withhold it than to run the
risk of a reversal. Your client has the right to have you exercise your
judgment upon this feature. I only Insist that, subject to this consideration,
there is nothing unethical or unprofessional in offering evidence, the admissibility of which is open to doubt, and to present fair arguments for its
admission. It is only when its admission is improperly pressed upon the
court, or when there is an underlying motive to get before the jury indirectly what you believe you cannot place before it directly, that a just ground
of. criticism is presented. The canon refers only to the offering of evidence
which one knows the court should reject, when coupled with the motive
of placing it before the jury by argument. On the whole, therefore, I believe
that the canon errs somewhat on the side of liberality.
The field upon which I have ventured opens almost indefinitely. I shall
not explore it much- further, but wish to mention one other topic. One of
the many pernicious effects of the so-called "exchequer rule," whereby the
appelllate court reverses a judgment if it finds any error in the record,
presuming prejudice from error, has been the creation of a practice of trying
a case in order to make a record, rather than in order to win below, because
on appeal the trial has been of the record rather than of the case. Lawyers
have been scrupulous to avoid inviting error on their own side, but have
been astute in leading the court to make erroneous rulings against them,
provided they could see, what they knew the appellate court would
ignore, that the ruling would not in fact prejudice their case. "I don't care
much what the verdict will be. I have got error into the record." How
often have lawyers made quch statements after the retirement of the jury!
I shall not attempt to characterize that policy. A description of the
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practice is sufficient, without express condemnation, and a proper characterization might involve the use of extreme language. Recent statutes
providing in effect for the affirmance of judgments notwithstanding error,
unless it appears that the error was of such a character as to affect the
substantial rights of the appellant, will, I hope, be. enforced by the appellate courts In such a manner as effectively to abolish the practice to which
I have referred by making it unprofitable.
It is a familiar, comment by American lawyers who have attended
English courts that the English advocate tries his. cases much more expeditiously than the American; that he interposes fewer objections, because practically no evidence is offered except what is admissible, or may be fairly
argued to be admissible; that he is more candid with the court and more
courteous toward his adversary; that, on the whole, he is a more skillful
advocate, and has a keener sense of the proprieties. This is because his
whole training has been for and in trial work. It Is not probable that we
shall ever have in the United States two legally recogniged classes of
lawyers, such as solicitors and barristers; but a differentiation between
"office" and trial lawyers has begun to appear, and has in some of the largest
cities become quite well marked.
In Englind the office of barrister is deemed the more dignified and the
higher in rank. Here the tendency is to relegate the mere trial lawyer to
an inferior rank. This tendency may be in part due to the very just realization on the part of the Ameican Bar that the highest and most worthy office
of the profession is so to advise clients as to avoid controversies if possible,
and when controversies arise to adjust them by agreement, or if necessary
by compromise, at least where it is possible to do so with less sacrifice than
that involved in protracted and expensive litigation.
I fear, however, that the tendency is a resultant of the concurrence of
the cause of which I have just spoken and of one less flattering to the trial
lawyer; that is, that our trial lawyers have become such -largely through
accident, and not by training. Too often their reputation is based upon
fluency of speech, nimbleness of intellect, and cleverness in producing
dramatic effects. Somtimes it is -based in part at least upon willingness a-nd
aptnesg "in devising tri*cks to obscure the issues, hoodwink the jury, and
achieve a verdict against the truth-at least regardless of the truth.
It is to be hoped that, as the differentiation in the profession becomes
more marked, the young man who essays the role of the trial lawyer will
specially study and train himself for the part, and that he will take for
his exelmplars, not the smart, shifty, and crafty practioners, who threaten
to bring discredit -upon trial work, if they have not already done so, but
the truly great advocates of today and of the past-men who know the
law; men who master the facts, and know how to arrange them and adduce
them; men who understand and perform their entire duty, not only to their
client, but to the court, to the state, and to the public.

